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Abstract 
 This paper is an academic treatment of the pricing of stallion seasons (a “season1” confers the  right to 
breed a mare to a stallion) The commercial stallion seasons market can be represented schematically as a 
triangle that normally has a single-digit number of stallions offering high-priced seasons in the narrow 
apex, a moderate number of stallions composing the middle section, and over 150 in the $5,000-$10,000 
range.2    We argue that it is logical for profit-maximizing stallion managers, most especially those in the 
apex of the stallion seasons triangle, to charge different prices for different groups of buyers of the same 
stallion seasons.  Some of the reasons are straightforward: seasons are worth less as the breeding season 
progresses because foals produced later in year from those seasons are worth less.  Other reasons have 
more to do with the somewhat monopolistic nature of the market for stallion seasons as explained in this 
paper.  This market power, in turn, creates multiple demand curves for different market segments.   
 As for artificial insemination (AI), the economics of this analysis suggests that breeders significantly 
benefit from the introduction of AI because costs  tend to fall and the choices of potential stallions 
available to  mares would be expanded as better stallions breed more mares. Though the average breeder 
would benefit, there would be losers from a change in the status quo.  Not surprisingly, those who stand 
to would lose from a move to AI argue against such a move.   
Keywords: artificial insemination, breeding, competition, monopolistic competition, monopoly, oligopoly, seasons contracts.  
JEL codes:  L1, L8, Q12, Q19 
April 16, 2020 
 
 
1 A “season” to a Thoroughbred stallion typically confers the right to breed one mare as many times during the 
February to June breeding season that are necessary to impregnate the mare.  Various arrangements are made for 
payment of the breeding season, but the most prevalent arrangement is that the season is due if the mare has a live 
foal that stands and nurses LFSN). 
2 For the 2019 breeding season there were nine stallions listed in the Blood-Horse Stallion Register offered for a fee 
of $100,000 or more in the United States, with the highest price being War Front’s $250,000.  There were 
approximately 160 in the $5,000 to $10,000 range. 
 2 
Introduction and Background 
A stallion can be viewed as a “firm” in the economic sense.3  Though a horse lover might decry 
this impersonal viewpoint, it is not unreasonable to view the stallion as analogous to a patented hobby 
horse stamping “machine” at a factory that produces designer label hobby horses. The analogy is more apt 
if we assume that the designer label hobby horses, though they share many similarities, are nevertheless 
all different in various ways.  They may vary in color, in size, by the types of wood that are used in their 
production, and more4.  Similarly, a stallion’s foals, though similar, vary significantly in many attributes, 
including color, size, temperament, and perhaps most importantly, ability to perform.   
It seems appropriate to classify both the hobby horse firm and the stallion firm as examples of 
monopolistic competition, but this classification is not without its complications.  The term itself, 
“monopolistic competition,” suggests that the monopolistically competitive firm shares some of the 
features of monopoly and some of the features of (perfect) competition.  If there is a line drawn between 
monopoly and perfect competition, and the closer on that line a firm is placed to the monopoly-anchored 
end of the line the more it resembles a monopoly, and the closer the firm is placed on the perfect 
competition-anchored end of the line the more it resembles perfect competition, then a monopolistically 
competitive firm should be placed somewhere near the middle of the line connecting monopoly and 
perfect competition. 
Classic textbook writer C. E. Ferguson (1972, page 319) points out that, like monopoly firms, 
monopolistically competitive firms have differentiated products that have no perfect substitutes.  But, 
unlike the usual representation of monopoly, where there are no close substitutes, in monopolistic 
 
3 A stallion will often be boarded along with other stallions at a farm that is a specialized breeding farm.  An 
economics student’s first inclination might be to view the farm as the “firm” so often discussed in the 
microeconomic literature.  However, in many cases each stallion at the farm will be owned by a different group of 
breeders (syndicate) and the stallions on the same farm will compete against each other, at least to a limited extent 
(though many farms attempt to minimize this competition by choosing a roster of stallions that are significantly 
differentiated one from the other).  So from this perspective it seems reasonable to view the stallion as a “firm” (or 
maybe a subsidiary firm of the farm) for which we can depict schedules and diagrammatic representations of 
demand for the seasons that the stallion produces, along with marginal revenue, and marginal, average and total cost 
curves.   
4 Perhaps the hobby horse differentiation occurs because of additional personalized work by factory artisans. 
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competition, there are close substitutes.  However, the degree of substitutability stops short of the perfect 
competition case.  The market for many farm products is considered to fit the perfect competition mold as 
well as any products where goods produced by different firms are virtually homogeneous, and thus 
perfect (or near-perfect) substitutes.  Like Ferguson, David Kreps (2004, page 285) suggests that “A 
monopolistically competitive industry comprises many suppliers (producers) and many demanders, 
but…the good in question is…differentiated.5”   
Other writers have noted the ability of firms to price differentiate or discriminate according to 
market segments or differentiated products or services.  Musa and Rosen (1978) discuss how monopolists 
can vary product quality so as to segment markets and to engage in price discrimination.    Varian (1992, 
pages 241-242) notes Pigou’s classic work (1920) on price discrimination and writes about first, second, 
and third-degree price discrimination.  An important consideration in price discrimination is the inability 
of a buyer to re-sell the product or service.  First degree price discrimination or perfect price 
discrimination is when the firm charges a price according to each consumer’s maximum willingness to 
pay.   
p(x) = u(x)       (1) 
where p(x) is the commodity’s price and u(x) is the consumer’s maximum utility.  This is approximated 
in horse breeding by top tier stallion owners to a certain degree through their ability to negotiate 
individual contracts with mare owners.  A more likely market condition in horse breeding is third-degree 
price discrimination where different customers pay different prices according to their elasticities of 
demand.  Mare owners’ elasticities can be said to vary according to how early or late it is in a particular 
horse breeding season as well as whether the stallion’s geographical location is near or far from the mares 
(geographic price segmentation).  Under third degree price discrimination the firm’s profit maximization 
is given by  
 
5 Ferguson and many other economists would argue that we would be better off characterizing monopolistic 
competition as a group of firms producing a “product group” rather than calling it an industry.  This view is based 
on the argument that the products, though similar, are sufficiently differentiated that calling a group of firms that 
produce close but imperfect substitutes an “industry” is stretching the definition of “industry.”  
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    p(x)[ 1 – 1 / ɛ ] = c           (2) 
where ɛ is the absolute value of the product’s price elasticity and c is marginal cost.   The smaller ɛ or the 
more inelastic demand is for a particular market segment, the greater the price.  One form of market 
segmentation according to elasticity is geographic market segmentation in which elasticities vary in 
different regions (Hoover 1937).  Finally, in some ways the unique DNA of each stallion can be likened 
to a firm having a patent on a unique product, and this in turns gives a patent holder monopoly or near 
monopoly pricing power (Scherer 1980), power that we argue that top tier owners possess when it comes 
to negotiating prices since there are no close substitutes for what they are offering.  Lower tier stallions 
have no such market power. 
An example of a group of closely related monopolistically competitive firms that is often cited is 
competition among different restaurants in an urban environment.  Locally owned, “five-star” restaurants 
offer an intimate dining service, ambience and hard to find menu items that are often prepared by top 
notch chefs.  Menu prices for these reasons are often high for different entrees, and this market serves a 
small, upscale market niche.  At the other end of the spectrum, national level, “chain” fast food 
restaurants engage in some sort of mass production for mass production, offer low price menus, and target 
a wider audience than the top scale restaurants.  Each of these types of firms has some pricing power, that 
is to say, although the lower end cannot raise its price too much because it has more competition and a 
greater amount of elasticity of demand for its products.  Each could raise price but continue to sell 
product (though sales volume would be expected to fall) but this pricing power is intermediate between 
the strong market power a monopoly firm has and the absence of market power that a perfectly 
competitive firm has.  Said another way, each firm faces a downward sloping demand curve, but the curve 
has more elastic points than the curve facing a monopolist.  Then again, it is not the completely flat curve 
or perfectly elastic configuration facing a perfectly competitive firm.   
A seller of a stallion season faces many of the market conditions that a monopolistically 
competitive firm does, but there is an important exception:  Each stallion is a unique individual producing 
seasons that have unique characteristics.  Unlike two boxes of a name brand detergent coming off the 
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assembly line that are perfect substitutes, even twins produced by a mare6 are always different, and every 
horse is different in a variety of ways.  The stallion seasons sold by the stallion firm provide the male 
zygote (sperm) that unites with a mare’s ovum to produce a fertilized egg that results in a foal eleven or 
so months later.  But, because each sperm carries a different combination of the genes of the stallion, each 
season is a unique product.  Thus, unlike products produced by the typical monopolistically competitive 
firm, the products (foals) produced by mating a stallion to a mare always are unique.  But, since there are 
typically many close substitutes for most seasons and for the foals that result from seasons, the fact that 
each season results in a foal that is unique often does not differentiate it enough to move this market type 
significantly toward monopoly and away from perfect competition on the line connecting the two market 
types.  Moreover it can be argued that even though every foal is different, and every set of genes 
delivered by a stallion breeding a mare will be different, the buyers of seasons to a particular stallion view 
each season by that stallion as one and the same product.  This is because the buyers do not know which 
set of genes their foal will receive, thus each season buyer can reasonably expect that (s)he is buying the 
average set of genes produced by the stallion in question.  True, they will find out when the foal develops 
that they almost certainly did not receive the “average” set of genes, but this cannot be determined when 
the season is sold. 
If we view a stallion as a firm, we can use the diagrammatic representation that we observe in 
virtually all microeconomics texts to represent costs, revenues, and equilibrium conditions. An example 
follows in Figure 1, but first a discussion is necessary about the costs and revenues associated with a 
stallion. 
(Insert Figure 1 around here) 
The costs associated with the “machine”, that is, our stallion and the major asset of the breeding 
“firm,” can be broken down into the usual fixed and variable costs.  Perhaps more so than is the case for 
most firms, most of the costs are fixed.  The major costs will typically be the sunk fixed costs associated 
 
6 Twins born to mares are almost invariably fraternal rather than identical twins, hence only 50% of their genes (on 
average) are the same. 
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with buying the stallion.  Other fixed costs arise from having to house and feed the stallion.  Only a small 
fraction of the costs of running the breeding firm centered around  stallions are variable costs: the costs of 
disposable products used in the breeding process, some of the veterinary costs, perhaps a portion of the 
marketing expenses, and possibly the breeding crew’s expenses. 
Consider in more detail the costs of the breeding crew that handles a thoroughbred stallion when 
he services mares (or the costs of the collecting semen when AI is used for other breeds).  If the stallion is 
contracted to breed one mare per season (which would be so uneconomical as to make no sense for a 
profit-maximizing operation, but is useful to consider for purposes of explaining this example), and 
presuming that this stallion is the only stallion at the farm where the stallion boards, then the farm might 
rent a crew from another farm for the one breeding.  The cost of the crew and related variable costs might 
run a hundred dollars or more. 
However, if the stallion breeds a significant number of mares, the farm will be more likely to hire 
an additional worker or two at the farm and also teach one or two regular farm hands how to manage a 
breeding stallion .  Under this scenario these costs can probably best be viewed as fixed costs because the 
crew is hired for the entire breeding season.  But, even if one wishes to argue that the crew could be let go 
on a moment’s notice if the stallion cannot breed, and thus that their costs are variable costs, the cost per 
service for an active stallion will be so low as to be a tiny fraction of the fixed costs of standing a valuable 
stallion. 
We thus represent the marginal costs of providing a season to an additional mare as dropping to 
very small amounts very quickly as more mares are bred.  If we view a portion of the marketing costs as 
fixed, and a portion as variable, then the costs of setting up to breed the first mare are high, but the 
marginal costs are extremely low once a stallion crew is contracted for the breeding season.  It thus seems 
logical to represent the marginal costs as dropping precipitously to almost nil for even a small number of 
mares bred (seasons sold), and staying low for the first hundred or so mares. 
A healthy and fertile stallion can typically naturally service a hundred or more mares without 
undue stress on him and without creating significant problems for stallion management or for season 
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buyers7.  However, as incremental mares are contracted to breed (without using AI) past a hundred or so, 
the breeding process becomes more and more a juggling act.  Multiple requests by mare owners are 
inevitably made to breed on the same day and queues have to be formed and managed by the stallion 
manager.  This may mean that some mares do not get bred at the optimal time.  Mare owners are not 
happy when this happens.  Postponing a breeding to a less optimal time decreases the chances of getting 
an early (and generally more valuable) foal, and decreases the chances of getting any foal at all.  If there 
is full information available, the effects on stallion season demand of breeding a large number of mares 
will most likely have been reflected in pushing the  demand curve to a lower level  than would be the case 
if the queuing phenomenon were not a factor.  The authors are of two minds as to how to show the effects 
of fertility on the cost and revenue curves of the stallion firm.  It is reasonable to argue that there is a 
demand curve for seasons contracted, and a lower “shadow” average revenue  curve that reflects the 
decreasing probability of mare owners paying for seasons because the probability of  producing live foals 
falls as more seasons are sold.   
An alternative way to deal with the effects of the decreasing probability of producing live foals is 
to view this as a cost (due primarily to the lower percentage of foals produced) associated with breeding 
the stallion more frequently and breeding some mares at suboptimal times. 
For the stallion represented in Figure 1, it is argued that the marginal costs of selling more 
seasons (which means breeding more mares) becomes increasingly significant once the stallion is 
contracted to breed 120 or so mares.  Past 180 mares the marginal cost skyrockets. In effect the stallion 
depicted has a ceiling of 180-185 mares that would rarely be exceeded even if the demand for the stallion 
increased substantially. 
If the stallion from Figure 1 is a Thoroughbred stallion he would be in the top two or three 
percent of stallions by stud fee.  The demand curve represented shows that some mare owners would be 
 
7 Because a stallion’s semen can be divided into multiple (three or four) portions without affecting the likelihood of 
impregnating a mare when artificial insemination (AI) is used, the “congestion” problem associated with large 
numbers of breeding sessions is greatly diminished when AI is utilized.  
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willing to pay $50,000 or more and that the equilibrium price if 180 mares are to be bred is $40,000 per 
season.  Terms for breeding contracts vary slightly from farm to farm, but a standard breeding contract 
would require that the $40,000 would be paid either when the foal stands and nurses or in the fall of the 
year that the mare was bred.  In the latter case, which fell out of favor during the “great recession” of 
2009-2011/12, the early fee payment would be refunded if a live foal is not born that stands and nurses. 
The equilibrium price is determined as per standard microeconomic analysis.  The breeding farm 
maximizes profit if it operates where marginal cost equals marginal revenue.  If the farm manager limits 
seasons sold to fewer than 180 mares the stallion firm foregoes some profits that would have been 
available because an additional mare would have added fewer costs than the additional revenue that 
would have been expected to be generated.  Breeding the 181st mare would be expected to lower profits 
because the marginal cost exceeds the marginal revenue from adding the 181st season contract to the 
stallion’s book. 
As represented in Figure 1, a hypothetical stallion, Forty Karets, “breaks even” in the sense that if 
180 seasons are sold, and revenues equal costs.  One might ask why a stallion whose stud fee is in the top 
two percent or so of stallions only breaks even.  One possible explanation is that Forty Karets was 
purchased just prior to the breeding season at a price that allows him to “break even.”8 
There are a variety of considerations that one might argue are glossed over by using the standard 
microeconomic treatment as per Figure 1.  It may be that the number of mares bred this year to the 
stallion affect the prices for seasons in future years.  This could happen for either of the two reasons 
explained below. 
1A. Normally we would expect that the greater the number of mares bred the lower their  
average quality (because the quality mares attracted at the lower prices necessary to induce more     
breedings is lower).  This typically translates into lower quality foals on average and a less 
successful race record for the stallion’s average runner in future years. 
 
8 Recall from a principles of economics course that “breaking even” is defined as making a “normal” profit.  So, 
Forty Karets is assumed to make a profit that is in line with the risk of his business. 
 9 
1B. More mares will mean a greater absolute number of foals running in the future.  More  
runners mean more winners, and probably more stakes winners as well. 
So what will be the effects from having more runners that on average are less successful?  The 
answer is not obvious.  The response of potential buyers of stallion seasons and of the foals produced via 
these stallion seasons will depend on whether the absolute number of good runners is more or less 
important to buyers than the average success of a stallion’s runners.   
A second complication, already briefly alluded to, relates to the effects of larger numbers of 
mares being bred to the stallion (larger books) on the stallion’s success at getting mares pregnant and the 
related question of the response of breeders to large books.  Larger books will almost certainly lower the 
percentages of mares that get in foal, will result in some foals being born later than they would had the 
stallion had a smaller book, and will almost certainly decrease the  desirability of breeding to the stallion.9  
It is the our view that the last of these three potentially negative factors should be reflected in the demand 
curve.  The negative effects of large books on the desire to breed to a stallion can be represented as 
causing the demand curve to be lower than it would be in the absence of this effect.  Perhaps then, the 
demand curve (and thus the marginal revenue curve), rather than being the straight line depicted in Figure 
1, should be bowed toward a rainbow shape. 
The effect of larger book size on the stallion’s ability to impregnate mares, and also the effect of 
larger book size in pushing some mares back to later breeding dates will adversely affect revenues.10  
However, perhaps it is reasonable to also view these negative effects on revenues as costs, and thus to 
reflect these effects in the shape of the marginal cost curve. 
This analysis represents the stallion as the lone major asset in a profit-maximizing firm.  The 
product that the firm sells is stallion seasons.  The analysis views the firm as operating in a market setting 
 
9 In a conversation that one of the authors had with a colleague in which he inquired as to why the colleague thought 
that the percentage of foals produced per mare bred was lower in recent years than fifteen or so years ago, his 
responses could be summarized in two words, “Bigger books!” 
10 One way to represent this would be to depict “net” average revenue and “net” marginal revenue curves that are 
adjusted for the fact that less than 100% of the mares contracted at the $40,000 stud fee will in fact end up paying 
the stud fee. 
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very close to monopolistic competition.  There are many sellers and many buyers (though not as many as 
in a perfectly competitive market) and the stallion/firm markets seasons that are different in some way 
from those produced by any other stallion, hence the market type cannot be perfect competition.  But the 
market type cannot be monopoly either, for a monopolistic firm produces goods that have no close 
substitutes, and that is not the case for the stallion/firm.   One hundred and eighty or so seasons are 
contracted for that are initially indistinguishable, and typically the majority of those seasons will result in 
production of foals for which there are good substitutes produced by other stallions, hence the seasons of 
our stallion have close substitutes for sale by other stallions.   
At the upper price levels for thoroughbred stallion seasons, there may be only a few stallions that 
are good substitutes for each other, in which case the market has some elements of oligopoly.  But, since 
stallions compete with other stallions with the same prices and also those that are both substantially lower 
and higher priced, applying the standard oligopoly model to thoroughbred stallions is complicated.   In 
the major market for Thoroughbred stallions, which is Kentucky, involving moderately-priced stallion 
seasons, and certainly in the markets for stallion seasons for breeds that allow artificial insemination, 
there are too many stallion/firms competing against each other to consider the situation oligopolistic, 
hence the monopolistic competition classification fits better.     
But, as previously mentioned, there is one deviation from the usual case under the monopolistic 
competition classification.  In many classical examples cited in the literature, monopolistic competitors 
produce multiple units of a homogeneous product that competes with similar but slightly different 
multiple homogeneous units of a closely related product.  However, because every sperm cell has 
different DNA, every season provided by a stallion is a unique product.  The authors of this analysis feel 
that this difference, though worthy of further analysis, creates only minor impediments to treating the 
stallion/firm as fitting into the monopolistic competition market type at lower and mid-level price ranges. 
The stallion/firm is reasonably represented by Figure 1 in which we show demand and marginal 
revenue curves that are downward sloping, and we represent marginal cost as having the usual U-shape 
(albeit with a lower value at its low point than in representations of many other products).  The 
 11 
equilibrium price, which is the price on the demand curve associated with the quantity of output where 
marginal cost equals marginal revenue, represents a logical approach to depicting the optimal level of 
output and the optimal price for the stallion/firm. 
True, there are some complications, most especially the fact that each stallion season contracted 
does not result in a payment to the seller because some mares do not produce a foal,  that perhaps can be 
treated in a more sophisticated manner in a follow-on analysis of the stallion/firm.  But, the approach 
taken provides a logical framework for analyzing the stallion/firm.   
This said, we move on to make the analysis more realistic and more useful by considering 
additional related topics.   First let us consider some of the decisions that go into setting the advertised 
price for stallion seasons, then we discuss the related topics of price discrimination and segmented 
markets. 
Pricing, Segmentation, and Price Discrimination 
One of the factors that complicates a stallion manager’s life is that (s)he must decide on the 
“farm” or advertised price that will appear in the stallion register applicable to the breed, whether 
Quarterhorse, Warmbred, Thoroughbred, or some other breed well before the breeding season starts.  
The latest date that this decision has to be made varies with the date that the stallion register is published, 
though in most cases the stallion register will be published in the late fall, and a decision must be made 
perhaps three to four weeks prior to the publication date in order to meet production deadlines. 
Even experienced stallion managers know that the price they post will not necessarily be the 
“right” price.  If the posted price turns out to be considered too high by most potential buyers, then the 
stallion manager will have to scramble to find enough mares to breed.  Occasionally an advertised price 
will be rescinded, and a new price announced, a phenomenon that is relatively rare.  More than a few 
advertised prices turned out to have been set too high for the 2009 breeding season after the financial 
crisis that hit full force in the United States in the fall of 2008 caused most breeders to revise downward 
how much they would be willing to pay for seasons.  As a result, more stallion managers marked down 
official season prices relative to those posted in stallion registers for the 2009 season than any time in 
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recent history.  And many of the farms that did not publicly announce price declines worked behind the 
scene to provide inducements and deals that amounted to de facto price declines. 
Stallion managers know that they may misestimate the appropriate price for stallion seasons, but 
when they do, they seem to prefer to err on the high side.  There is logic to this preference, and an 
analogy to pricing in some financial markets serves to illustrate this preference.  Large banks post rates 
(which amount to posting prices) that they are willing to pay on certificates of deposit.  In many cases 
these posted rates are lower (the prices are higher) than the rates that the banks are willing to accept.  All 
a customer (especially a good customer) has to do is to ask for a better rate and in many cases the higher 
rate (lower price) will be granted.  But you ask, “why didn’t the bank just post the rate it would pay and 
save everybody time and effort?  The answer is that banks, like stallion managers, know that sometimes 
the rates they post will turn out to be too low.  Perhaps a surprise announcement from the Fed causes rates 
to drop and the bank finds that before it can post a new lower rate it gets “hit” by customers asking for the 
posted rate.  The bank could say, “Well, we were just kidding – those rates were designed to generate 
customer traffic…” or some other rationalization.  The stallion manager could do something similar.  But, 
customers might consider such a reaction with disdain, and the reputations of the bank and stallion 
manager might be impaired.  Instead, what we see is that banks and stallion managers both tend to post 
prices that are above market, but are willing to negotiate downward, especially for good customers.11  
This way both the bank and the stallion manager don’t have to sell seasons at bargain prices because the 
market changed quickly or because the advertised price was an underestimate of the value placed by 
potential buyers on the stallion’s seasons. 
There are other reasons why stallion managers prefer to post prices that are on the high side of 
market value.  One reason why high prices are posted is because some (especially new) buyers don’t stop 
to ask if the price can be negotiated downward.  A quick story suffices to illustrate the logic of posting 
 
11 “Good” customers might be long-term customers, new customers with multiple mares, or a customer with an 
especially good mare that might have a good chance of “helping” the stallion in the sales ring or on the track.  Or, if 
the stallion manager has badly overestimated the market price of his stallion, the definition of a good customer 
might be revised to “anyone remotely interested.” 
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above-market prices.  An acquaintance whom one of the authors has helped with her breeding plans once 
remarked to me that she rarely tries to negotiate for lower stallion season prices.  She went on to say that 
she felt that stallion managers should post the “right” price and save her the time and effort involved in a 
negotiating process in which she really did not like to get involved.  It was pointed out to her that she was 
not alone in disliking the process, but that one of the reasons stallion managers posted above-market 
prices was because they know that some buyers make no effort to negotiate.   
This example can be viewed as one type of price discrimination by stallion managers, in this case 
discrimination against non-negotiating buyers.  Stallion managers often post above-market prices, then 
charge customers who accept posted prices more than they charge savvier customers who bargain for 
lower prices.  Stallion managers are able to do this in part because of differences in customer attitudes, 
but also because stallion managers often negotiate one-on-one with each individual customer12.  Being 
able to negotiate one-on-one allows the stallion manager to try to “size the customer up” much as a used-
car salesperson sizes up the walk-in looking for a car.  Does the customer look/sound like (s)he (1)has a 
lot of money?  (2) has shopped around for good buys elsewhere?  (3) is a knowledgeable buyer? (4) has a 
strong preference for the product on the sales floor?   The sales person who can make good assessments 
of the traits of each customer stands a better chance of extracting the maximum price from each customer.  
But, unless an above-market price had been posted in the first place, the room for negotiation (and profit 
to the seller) will be lessened. 
Asymmetric information in economic markets is defined as a situation where buyers and sellers 
have different levels of information about a product being sold.  In almost all cases the seller knows more 
 
12 The term “discriminating monopolist” is used here even though we have characterized the stallion seasons market 
as monopolistic competition.  The point though, is that any time a seller has a unique product, the seller has a degree 
of monopoly power.  For astute customers the degree of monopoly power will be small, as the astute customer will 
walk away if prices are unreasonable.  However, the customer who walks in feeling that (s)he just has to have a 
season in the stallion “Speedball” because he is the only stallion that really matches well with her mare puts the 
customer into a position where the seller has substantial monopoly power, and the result will usually be a higher 
price than for other customers. 
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about the product (and what it is worth) than the buyer.13  However, some potential customers know more 
about the stallion than others.  For racing stallions, the customer who knows that the stallion won that 
“grade 1 race” such as the Kentucky Derby or the Breeders’ Cup because the pre-race favorite was 
scratched, or the best horse was carried five wide by a horse that bore out, or the favorite “jumped a 
shadow” will probably not be willing to pay as high a price as the customer who doesn’t know this.  
Additionally, as Stowe (2013) has written, aggregate progeny winnings of a particular sire are a better 
predictor of a stallion’s stud fees than winnings per progeny, a fact which seems to indicate some 
variation in quality that mare owners or later buyers receive and see when the foals go on to compete.        
Sellers use price discrimination because they know that different customers have different prices 
they are willing to pay for seasons.  It is often possible to segregate potential buyers into categories where 
it is logical to charge different prices.  Some of the reasons for price discrimination by groups are more 
obvious than others.  A sprinting thoroughbred stallion might be equally successful as a sire of both 
thoroughbred and quarter horse runners.  But chances are that the Quarterhorse breeders will be unwilling 
to pay as much as Thoroughbred breeders, with the explanation having two strands of reasoning: 
1) The average Thoroughbred runner makes more money than the average Quarterhorse runner, 
hence the demand from Quarterhorse breeders will be less. 
2) Quarterhorse mares do not have to have a “live cover” (they use artificial insemination [AI]) 
and the economics of AI are such that lower prices prevail.  More on this later. 
Thoroughbred stallion managers could set the same price for any mare bred to their stallions and tell the 
Quarterhorse breeders to “take it or leave it.”  We show later in this paper that this would normally be a 
mistake. 
A second type of price discrimination can be based on geographic location.  Market segmentation 
based on geography became more prevalent during the 2009-2011 downturn in the Thoroughbred market.  
All types of price discrimination, if logically based, reflect differences in the demand by different 
 
13 There are exceptions when the buyer benefits by asymmetric information.  The expert buyer of rare books might 
find a book at a yard sale priced at $1 that is in fact a rare edition worth thousands.   
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individuals or different groups.  Thoroughbred breeders in Kentucky generally breed better and more 
expensive mares, and expensive mares tend to be owned by wealthy owners.  Thoroughbred breeders in 
Pennsylvania, Ohio, Indiana, Illinois, and every other state tend to have less expensive mares and tend to 
be less wealthy.  (Similar reasoning may help explain why prescription drug prices are lower in less 
affluent countries). 
(Insert Figures 2 and 3 around here) 
Though there are exceptions, the generally less-wealthy breeders outside Kentucky have 
relatively lower demand for stallions in Kentucky than do Kentucky breeders.  Relative wealth explains 
part of the difference.  Distance from Kentucky necessitating van and hauling costs plus boarding costs 
explain much of the remainder of the differences in demand.  Figure 1 reflected an overall demand curve, 
whereas Figure 2 segments the demand from Kentucky and from out of state for the stallion from Figure 
1. 
If we return to Figure 1 and consider the equilibrium conditions, the equilibrium quantity is 180 
mares when the stallion manager considers the demand for Forty Karets seasons as a whole rather than 
considering Kentucky and out-of-state demand separately.  If the Kentucky and out-of-state demand are 
broken out and appear as in Figure 2, a price of $40,000 charged in both markets would result in 
approximately 175 KY mares and 5 out-of-state mares.14  But a discerning economics student is likely to 
argue that the equilibrium number of Kentucky mares should be fewer than 175 and out-of-state mares 
should be greater than 5.   
A look at the orange horizontal line in the two diagrams representing a price of $40,000 reveals 
that it intersects the in-state demand curve at a quantity of 175 mares and the out-of-state demand curve at 
5 mares.  But that combination does not fulfill the classic equilibrium conditions that have the marginal 
revenue (rather than price) equal in both market segments in order to maximize the stallion firm’s profits.  
And since the in-state MR is less than the out-of-state MR at 175 in-state and 5 out-of-state mares, the 
 
14 These diagrams may be improperly scaled, but hopefully that does not make interpretation difficult. 
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firm could make more money by contracting to breed fewer in-state mares and more out-of-state mares.  
The black numbers (160 and 20) rather than the orange numbers (175 and 5) reflect revenue maximizing 
quantities of in and out-of-state mares respectively.15   
Note that in all figures we have to this point assumed that the stallion/firm does not practice price 
discrimination vis-à-vis individuals a la the used car salesman approach.  Practicing individual price 
discrimination by negotiating individually with each potential purchaser could mean even greater profits, 
and in effect means that the stallion manager further subdivides the in-state and out-of-state markets 
based on his/her perception of the demand for seasons from sub-groups of potential buyers. 
How would the stallion/firm implement the market segmentation strategy?  There are several 
ways to do this, but the simplest would be to announce an advertised season price of $42,000.  This would 
mean that exactly the right number of in-state seasons would be sold.  As for out-of-state seasons, where 
the demand is less, rigidly adhering to the $42,000 price would mean that sales of out-of-state seasons do 
not generate sufficient volume.  A careful reading of Diagram 1B by this writer suggests that the number 
of seasons sold out-of-state at a price of $42,000 would be zero.    
What the stallion manager must do is find a way to lower the price for out-of-state sales so that 
the marginal revenue in both markets is equated.  The most direct way to do this is to publish two prices, 
one for in-state and one for out-of-state breeders.  If the demand from in-state breeders is greater the in-
state price will be higher than the out-of-state price.  Note that it is possible that the opposite pricing 
strategy makes sense if in-state demand is lower.  Posting different prices is sometimes done, but rarely as  
discussed above.16 
 
15 If 180 mares are bred at a contractual price of $40,000 each, the potential revenue (if all produce a foal for which 
the stud fee is paid) will be 180 x 40K = $7.2 million.  If 165 in-state mares are bred at a price of $42,000 each and 
15 out-of-state mares at $36,000 each, the potential revenue is 165 x $42K + 15 x $36K = $7.47 million.  More 
realistically the likely revenue must be decreased to adjust for unpaid stud fees because of barren mares or non-
paying customers.  This adjustment does not change the logic of this analysis. 
16 In states that have breeder funds that pay stallion owners a percentage of the winnings of in-state runners, the 
extra potential earnings from this source makes it logical to encourage in-state breeders by charging them lower fees 
for stallion seasons than are charged to out-of-state breeders who will not race locally.  This approach is taken by 
many stallion managers in Pennsylvania. 
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A seller who uses price discrimination faces several potential negative reactions.  Breeders talk to 
each other, and if they see that a lower price is charged in one market they will attempt to access the 
lower price.  A Kentucky breeder with a friend in Pennsylvania will ask the friend to write to the 
Kentucky farm to obtain Pennsylvania prices for seasons for his Kentucky mare.  Perhaps more 
importantly, if breeders observe direct price discrimination, which is most obvious when two different 
prices are quoted, they may balk at paying the higher price.  Stallion managers know this, and to decrease 
adverse customer reactions they are likely to undertake more subtle methods of segmenting markets for 
price discrimination purposes.  Instead of posting two prices, stallion managers might instead obtain a list 
of out-of-state breeders and offer them less obvious concessions.  Free board during the breeding season 
and compensation for vanning bills from out-of-state are two of several possible ways that the posted 
price is effectively discounted. 
(Insert Table 1 around here) 
Preliminary data analysis supports several of our arguments.  Table 1 shows that in using 
breeding data from Bloodhorse.com (2019), we find that around 75% of the variation in the natural log of 
a stallion’s stud fee in 2018 can be explained by three variables: 
1. the log of the total earnings of the stallion’s offspring from the previous year.  This variable is 
used to indicate consumer or mare owner expectations regarding the stallion.  Similar to 
Stowe (2013), average earnings per progeny which entered races the year before is found to 
be a weaker predictor of stud fees than total earnings.  Perhaps mare owners dwell more on 
the latter than considering the former, which could perhaps imply some type of irrationality in 
purchasing and signing a contract for stud services.   
2. the log of the portion of all mares bred by each horse listed as a share of all horses.  The top 
20 sires accounted for around 50% of all mares bred indicating some type of control over 
“output/production”, which is a characteristic of some type of market concentration; and  
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3. a dummy variable where 1 = Kentucky and 0 = all other states where the hypothesis is that 
Kentucky based stallions have a greater share of the market and more inelastic supply.  Stowe 
(2013) found this to be a statistically significant factor in predicting stud fees in her sample.  
Because of problems of heteroscedasticity, robust standard errors are used in the model developed.  No 
evidence of collinearity was found.  All three variables are statistically significant at α < 0.05 with the 
coefficient for 2017 earnings showing that on average a 10% increase in earnings yields a 14.6% increase 
in stud fees.   The coefficient for mares bred shows that a 10% increase in the number of mares bred 
yields a 2.8% increase in stud fees, which indicates some degree of market power and market 
concentration.  And the coefficient for the dummy variable indicates that a potential sire based in 
Kentucky is associated with 0.74% higher stud fee than stallions in other parts of the US.  Therefore, 
Kentucky stallion owners appear to be able to charge higher prices than their counterparts in other states.   
 In accounting for the concentration of breeding among top stallions, it has been found using 
Bloodhorse.com records that the overall number of stallions offered for stud services has gradually and 
dramatically declined from 3098 in 2005 to 1136 in 2019.  (Bloodhorse.com 2005-2019).  Parallel to this, 
840 foals were born from stallions who mated with 140 or more mares in 2005 whereas in 2019 there 
were 1397 foals sired by stallions who mated with 140 or more mares that year. More importantly, the 
number of foals produced by the top 20% of the stallions accounted for around 69% of the mares mated in 
2005 whereas in 2019 the top 20% were matched with 75% of the mares bred.  Concentration among the 
stop stallions appears to have increased.   
At the same time, overall foal production has declined dramatically since 1990.  The website of 
the Jockey Club shows that US foal output has gone from 40,333 in 1990 to an estimated 19,225 in 2019, 
and this is reflected in Figure 4 (Jockey Club Fact Book 1990 to 2019).  Correspondingly, the number of 
races held in the US on annual basis has also declined dramatically as shown in Figure 5 (Jockey Club 
Fact Book 1990 to 2019) as inflation adjusted purses per race have stagnated after adjusting for inflation.  
Therefore, tough times and a decline in the racing industry have sunk the demand for foals in general with 
fewer stallions participating in the market, and this in turn has resulted in even greater concentration 
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among the top stallions.  Given the high aggregate earnings of their offspring and fewer competitors over 
time, it is understandable that their numbers of customers have gone up despite increasing stud fees.        
Conclusion: Implications and Questions Regarding Artificial Insemination 
Students of equine studies know that thoroughbred breeding requirements, which are set by the 
Jockey Club, require that mares be bred in the natural fashion, and any foal that results from an artificial 
method of insemination is banned from being registered.  In contrast, almost every other breed allows 
artificial insemination, which typically involves shipping cooled or frozen semen from the farm where the 
stallion resides to the farm where the mare is boarded.  What follows is a preliminary analysis of the 
economics of artificial insemination (AI) that builds on the previous analyses. 
Recall that in Figure 1, which assumed that current breeding rules prevailed, we represented the 
equilibrium for Forty Karets as the level of output (number of seasons sold)  where marginal cost and 
marginal revenue were equal.  This resulted in an equilibrium price of $40,000 and at a quantity of 
seasons sold (mares bred) of 180. What would be different if AI were allowed? 
If AI is allowed, it will not be restricted to one stallion.  But, it is useful to consider this 
intermediate condition as a stepping stone in the analysis that follows.  This will assist in understanding 
what will ultimately result if AI is allowed for all Thoroughbred stallions.  Juxtaposed to Figure 1, Figure 
3 is modified for the obvious changes that will occur for a stallion/firm that operates exclusively using 
artificial insemination.  There are two significant differences under AI: 
1. The demand curve, though sloping downward, will not drop off as fast at higher numbers of 
seasons sold.17  This is because under AI the probability of your mare being queued is 
significantly diminished.  While even the most fertile stallion can provide only four covers a 
day, and very few do that on a regular basis, an AI stallion can be collected and the sample 
split so that many more mares can be serviced.  As a result, there is less chance under AI that 
a mare will not be bred at the optimal time because of a breeding shed queue, and thus mare 
 
17 Recall that this concern was discussed, but that the demand curve in Figure 1 was not drawn to reflect a 
significant concern about a mare being queued. 
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owners booking to AI stallions with large books do not discount what they will pay for 
season prices as much because of the decreased probability of getting a mare bred at the right 
time.    
2. The marginal cost curve under AI will differ in at least two respects.   
A. It may tend to be a bit higher in the middle ranges because of the cost of the 
technology for breeding under AI guidelines.  Whether cooled or frozen semen is 
used there will be a significant cost to providing transportation for its storage and 
delivery. 
B. The marginal cost curve will be closer to flat over a wider range than for natural 
breeding.  This is because there will be little to no decline in the incidence of 
pregnancy for mares as more mares are bred.  The higher percentages of mares that 
produce live foals will mean fewer costs to the stallion/firm associated with breeding 
higher numbers of mares.  However, the marginal cost will turn up because a milder 
case of the queuing problem will occur as large numbers of seasons are sold.  And, 
under AI, if stallion managers try to adjust by skimping on the amount of semen they 
ship they may find that there will be a cost in terms of lower numbers of pregnant 
mares.  (Note that if “regulators” such as the Jockey Club restrict the number of 
mares bred under AI the queuing problem diminishes or disappears.) 
3. The average cost curve will change little for lower levels of season sales, but will be lower at 
higher quantities of seasons sold under AI.  This occurs because the lower marginal cost of production 
under AI pulls the average cost down at these higher levels of season sales. 
In Figure 3, when Forty Karets is the only stallion using AI, the result is a lower marginal cost of 
production at higher levels of output, and the lower marginal cost curve pulls the average cost curve down 
below the average revenue curve.  At the new (higher) equilibrium of output Forty Karets now makes 
more than the normal profit assumed in Figure 1.  In summary, under the Figure 3 conditions, Forty 
Karets has the same demand curve as in Figure 1, but lower marginal and average costs.  The marginal 
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cost curve intersects the (unchanged) marginal revenue curve at a higher level of output (higher level of 
season sales), and this higher level of season sales can only be sold at a lower price than under Figure 1.  
But costs are lowered more than revenues, and thus Forty Karets is now projected to make an above 
average economic profit.  
 If Forty Karets is one of many stallions in his price range, then the increased market share he 
garners as a result of AI will have a negligible effect on demand for other stallion seasons, and the profits 
of his competitors will diminish slightly as Forty Karets attracts a small number of mares from each close 
substitute stallion.  In the price range ($40,000 or so) used in this example however, Forty Karets is likely 
to be one of only a relatively small number of stallions, and Forty Karets’ lower price and higher volume 
of season sales will have a noticeable (and negative) effect on his closest competitors’ profits and 
volumes of season sales. 
The Jockey Club would not put themselves in the position of favoring one stallion by allowing it 
to use AI and not another.  The analysis just completed was an interim step to the solution that will result 
if all stallions can use AI.  The analysis to this point has, among other things, utilized standard tools of 
microeconomic analysis in diagramming plausible scenarios for revenues, costs and prices.  But before 
proceeding further we need to be more specific about assumptions.  More specifically the assumptions 
regarding the demand for stallion seasons should be discussed.  Figures 1 and 3 show the quantity 
demanded for an individual stallion’s seasons to be downward sloping with respect to price.  Said another 
way, if a stallion manager lowers price, the number of seasons demanded by buyers will be greater.  What 
was discussed only peripherally was the effect on demand if the prices of competitors’ stallion seasons 
change.  In one extreme case this discussion would not be necessary.  That would be the case where there 
are no substitutes for the stallion seasons of a particular stallion (and no substitutes from the perspective 
of buyers of foals for the foals produced by this particular stallion).  This argument is equivalent to 
arguing that the stallion operates as a monopoly. 
In this (admittedly extreme) case, the demand for “NOSUB” stallion seasons will be steeper than 
that of a stallion whose seasons have substitutes.  The assumption of no substitutes for seasons or foals 
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produced from these seasons implies that the no-substitutes stallion’s seasons and foals trade in a market 
that is insulated from the market for other seasons and foals.  The normal expectation is that the market-
clearing price for a stallion’s seasons will drop in sympathy when the prices of competitors’ seasons fall.  
This logic assumes that if Stallion A’s season price was not lowered in response to declines in 
competitors’ prices, then buyers who were on the fence about whether to breed to stallion A or stallion B 
would move to stallion B if its seasons were offered at lower prices as long as stallion A’s seasons are 
unchanged.  But, if no one is ever on the fence (as will be the case with the no-substitutes stallion) then 
the prices of other stallion seasons are not a factor in the pricing for a NOSUB stallion. 
More realistically, the demand for a stallion’s seasons is a function of not just one, but two major 
(and many other perhaps less important) factors.  In addition to the price of the stallion’s seasons breeders 
also consider the prices of other stallions’ seasons.  The quantity demanded is expected to decrease as the 
quoted (own-price) of a stallion’s seasons increase, and the quantity demanded is expected to increase as 
the prices of competitor stallion seasons increase.   
When we consider the case in which all stallions move to AI, we will have to rethink Figure 3.  If 
all stallions move to AI, the decline in the marginal cost curve will cause all stallions to want to move 
down their demand curves to an increased level of stallion seasons sales at a lower price (as is shown for 
Forty Karets in comparing Figure 1 with Figure 3, where the optimal level of output changes from 180 
seasons to 280 seasons).  But, if all stallions are making similar adjustments, the new equilibrium 
depicted in Figure 2 is not possible.  More particularly, the market will be flooded with seasons that were 
not available previously, with the result that the demand curve for Forty Karets and the demand curves for 
all other stallions will drop due to the lower prices available from competitors.  Each stallion for which 
there is considerable demand will be likely to sell more seasons, but at lower prices.  The demand for 
some stallions that bred significant numbers of mares (30-50?) will drop so low that they will breed few 
(or no) mares.  Detractors of AI will argue that the gene pool will be narrowed.  We would argue that 
breeders could (and probably would) breed to more proven stallions because of lower prices, and that the 
quality of the breed will improve as a result.  Moreover, breeders will be well aware of the possibility of a 
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narrowing gene pool, and it will be in their best interests to widen the gene pool when it will result in 
better foals.  However, there are many unanswered questions, and these are: 
1. Will the use of proven stallions increase relative to young unproven stallions?  
Almost certainly since their lower prices and increased availability will tend to attract breeders – 
the Thoroughbred industry has seen a variation on this theme over recent decades as improved 
veterinary practices has allowed stallion book sizes to increase dramatically. 
2. Will the quality of foals increase or decrease?  
Quality is likely to increase modestly for several reasons – Proven stallions produce higher 
quality foals than the average unproven stallion.) 
3. Will the quantity of foals increase or decrease?  Will the cost of producing foals increase or 
decrease? 
 AI will probably lower cost of producing foals by making using a van to/from the stallion farm 
unnecessary.  Out-of-state owners will not have to pay board in Kentucky and other breeding 
centers.  AI will also diminish the probability of sexually-transmitted diseases that have 
periodically plagued the Thoroughbred industry. Lower costs and greater access to quality 
stallions will tend to increase the average quality and lower the average cost of producing foals.  
This will tend to increase the attractiveness of breeding and thus the number of foals produced. 
4. Will resources be freed up to make the overall economy more efficient? 
Though van drivers, Kentucky boarding farms and Kentucky vets will have less to do, savings to 
breeders will stimulate sales in other areas. 
5. Why doesn’t the Thoroughbred industry move to AI?   
Almost certainly a part of that answer is related to a phenomenon that Milton Friedman (1984) 
labeled “The Tyranny of the Status Quo.”  Will not the many good folks who are members of the 
Jockey Club that governs the Thoroughbred industry either consciously or unconsciously try to 
protect their own and their friends interests, which more often than not will mean protecting large 
Kentucky breeding farms, often to the detriment of the average breeder and racing fan?  Such was 
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the argument made by Coelho and McClure over 30 years ago from the time of this writing, and 
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Figure 3:  Total US Foal Crop


























































































































































Figure 4:  Number Of US Races per Year
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Table 1: Least Squares Regression Output with Robust Standard Errors 
Dependent Variable: Ln of Stud Fee 
     b 
         (robust s.e) 
 
Ln Mares Bred % Total   0.28** 
     (0.11) 
 
Ln 2017 Earnings   1.46*** 
                 (0.19) 
 
Geographic Dummy Variable  0.74*** 
     (0.13) 
 
Intercept    -14.44 
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